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Abstract 
A central finding in happiness research is that a person’s income relative to the average income in her 
social reference group is more important for her life satisfaction than the absolute level of her income. 
This dependence of life satisfaction on relative income can be related to the reference dependence of 
the value function in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. In this paper we investigate 
whether the characteristics of the value function like concavity for gains, convexity for losses, and loss 
aversion apply to the dependence of life satisfaction on relative income. This is tested with a new 
measure for the reference income for a large German panel for the years 1984-2001. We find 
concavity of life satisfaction in positive relative income, but unexpectedly strongly significant 
concavity of life satisfaction in negative relative income as well. The latter result is shown to be robust 
to extreme distortions of the reported-life-satisfaction scale. It implies a rising marginal sensitivity of 
life satisfaction to more negative values of relative income, and hence loss aversion (in a wide sense). 
This may be explained in terms of increasing financial obstacles to social participation. 
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1. Introduction 
A basic postulate of utility theory is that utility rises with income. However, empirical research on 
subjective well-being (see Frey and Stutzer, 2002a, for an overview) has shown that in most developed 
countries average happiness has not or only slightly increased over the last fifty years despite high 
economic growth. This paradox has been explained by Easterlin (1974, 2001) and Frank (1997) in 
terms of rising aspirations and social comparison. The level of one’s income relative to that of other 
people is more important than its absolute level, and if absolute income rises for everybody at the 
same pace, relative income does not change. This importance of relative income was found earlier by 
Duesenberry (1949) in his seminal study on individual consumption and savings behaviour. In 
addition, Duesenberry postulated that social comparisons of income are not symmetric. In the context 
of happiness this means that the happiness of poorer people is negatively affected by the income of 
their richer peers, whereas richer people do not become happier from comparing their income with that 
of poorer members of their reference group. 
Thirty years later, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced their prospect theory as an 
alternative to the standard microeconomic theory of choice. It includes a value function that is defined 
over gains and losses with respect to some natural reference point and that is concave for gains and 
convex for losses. It is also assumed to be steeper for losses than for gains, which is referred to as loss 
aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Finally, the value function is hypothesized to be as convex 
for losses as it is concave for gains (reflection effect, Kahneman (2003); see Köbberling et al. (2004) 
for a different hypothesis). 
These characteristics of the value function have been tested extensively for decision utility and 
psychological perceptions (see Köbberling et al. for an overview), but, as Kahneman (1999, p. 19) 
states, “the extent to which loss aversion is also found in experience is not yet known”. In this context 
there is an interesting relationship with the dependence of happiness on the average income in a social 
reference group as postulated by Easterlin, Frank and others. Such a social reference income provides 
a natural reference point for people to compare their own income with. Income relative to this social 
reference income then corresponds to gains for positive values and to losses for negative values. 
Moreover, the asymmetry in the income comparison assumed by Duesenberry amounts to loss 
aversion in Kahneman and Tversky’s theory. This raises the question whether the other characteristics 
of the value function like concavity for gains and convexity for losses may also apply to this 
dependence of happiness on relative income. 
In this paper we test whether the characteristics of Kahneman and Tversky’s value function 
hold for individual life satisfaction. A significant positive dependence of life satisfaction on relative 
income has been found in the econometric cross-section and panel studies of McBride (2001), Stutzer 
(2004), and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005). Furthermore, the last study finds support for the asymmetry 
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postulate of Duesenberry. However, the measures for reference income that were used in the three 
studies have some drawbacks that we try to improve on by introducing a refined measure. With this 
new measure we then test all the characteristics of Kahneman and Tversky’s value function mentioned 
for a large German panel (GSOEP) spanning the years 1984 to 2001. 
To test for concavity in positive relative income and convexity in negative relative income, we 
need a more flexible specification of life satisfaction in terms of relative income than the usual 
logarithmic one since the latter is concave in negative as well as positive relative income. Moreover, 
the specification should allow for asymmetries in the income comparison. For these purposes an 
asymmetric power-function specification is chosen, which includes the logarithmic specification as a 
special case. We then find concavity of life satisfaction in positive relative income, but unexpectedly 
strongly significant concavity of life satisfaction in negative relative income as well. Moreover, under 
plausible assumptions about the cardinal properties of the ‘true-life-satisfaction’ scale, the latter result 
turns out to be robust to extreme distortions of the reported-life-satisfaction scale (such as suggested 
by Oswald, 2005). It entails a strong rejection of the hypothesized convexity and implies a rising 
marginal sensitivity of life satisfaction to more negative values of relative income. Although this result 
is in line with the standard assumption of diminishing marginal utility of income in microeconomics, 
the contradiction with the convexity suggested by prospect theory calls for an explanation. One 
possible explanation is that as a person’s income falls increasingly short of that in the reference group, 
it becomes increasingly and more than proportionally hard to raise the funds to participate in the social 
activities of the reference group. This effect of rising marginal social participation costs of falls in 
relative income apparently dominates a possible social comparison effect of diminishing marginal 
sensitivity of life satisfaction to such falls, which is suggested by the theory of Kahneman and 
Tversky. Moreover, it is shown to imply significant loss aversion (in a wide sense and at least for 
larger losses). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formulates the hypotheses to be tested, and 
Section 3 discusses the problems of testing cardinal properties of true life satisfaction and our way to 
tackle these problems. Next, in Section 4 the life satisfaction equations are presented, and in Section 5 
the new reference group measure, data and estimation procedure are discussed. Section 6 presents and 
analyses the estimation results, and Section 7 analyses their robustness to distortions of the reported-
life-satisfaction scale and to various modifications. Finally, Section 8 discusses possible explanations 
and behavioural implications of the results, and Section 9 concludes. 
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2. Hypotheses 
2.1. Empirical findings 
While the influence of social comparison on individual preferences in decision-making and on income 
and job satisfactions has already been investigated for quite some time (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) 
for a recent overview), econometric studies that estimate the impact of social comparison on individual 
life satisfaction are rather recent. In cross-section and panel studies for American, Swiss and German 
data McBride (2001), Stutzer (2004) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) find that overall life satisfaction of 
individuals negatively depends on the average (real) incomes in their social reference groups. 
Moreover, the difference between their own income and such social reference income turns out to be a 
more important determinant of individual life satisfaction than the absolute level of income. This 
difference between income and reference income is referred to as relative income. 
The empirical findings on the impact of social comparison on individual preferences, income 
and job satisfactions, and life satisfaction are partially consistent with the more general value-function 
theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) for decisions under risk and of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1991) for riskless choice (see the latter paper for references). The social reference income provides a 
natural reference point for people, to which they compare their own income, and the asymmetry result 
of Ferrer-i-Carbonell suggests loss aversion. On the other hand, in contrast to Kahneman and 
Tversky’s value-function theory, most studies employ a utility function that is concave in negative as 
well as positive relative income.2 The characteristics of the value function have been tested extensively 
for decision utility and psychological perceptions (see Köbberling et al. for an overview), but, as 
Kahneman (1999, p. 19) indicates and as far as we know, characteristics like loss aversion have not 
been tested for experienced utility as measured ex post. 
Some indications on possible properties of such experienced utility are given by 
psychophysical experiments reported by Galanter (1990). In one such experiment subjects were asked 
to imagine that they lost $5, and to name the amount of money they would have to lose to make them 
exactly twice as upset as losing $5. The geometric means of the subjects’ judgments was $21, and 
fitting this to a power function of the form baMU −=  yielded an exponent b equal to 0.54. A variety 
of cross-modality matching experiments yielded similar values of b, always a bit greater than 0.5, for 
losses, but for gains values of b always a bit smaller than 0.5. In general, loss aversion was found, and 
this finding as well as those of concavity for gains and convexity for losses is consistent with the 
characteristics of Kahneman and Tversky’s value function.3  
                                                 
2 Clark and Oswald (1998) derive the behavioural implications of utility that is concave or convex in status (i.e., 
‘relative action’ in analogy to relative income).  See Sec. 8.2 for more details. 
3 Kahneman (1999, p. 19) claims that the difference in the estimates of exponent b for gains and losses would not 
account for the extensive loss aversion observed in choice experiments. However, we did not find evidence for 
this claim in the analysis of Gallanter (see his Fig. 4).  
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 However, the utility that was measured in these experiments is not experienced utility as 
measured ex post, but rather experienced utility as imagined ex ante. In the terminology of Kahneman 
et al. (1997) this may be called predicted utility as distinct from experienced utility per se. It might be 
considered as an intermediate case between experienced utility and decision utility and may deviate 
from both. In this paper, we focus on experienced utility as measured ex post in surveys. More 
specifically, we test the characteristics of the value function for the shapes of life satisfaction functions 
for income levels above and below the average incomes in social reference groups.  
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
Based on Kahneman and Tversky’s value function, the following hypotheses will be tested for 
experienced utility: 
 
H1: Individual life satisfaction (S) depends significantly negatively on the average (real) family 
income in a social reference group, controlling for (real) family income, family size and 
composition, and other relevant variables. 
 
This hypothesis is based on what one would expect on the basis of psychological and sociological 
theories of social reference processes (e.g., Festinger, 1954), and has been confirmed by the empirical 
studies of McBride (2001), Stutzer (2004), and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) cited above. On the other 
hand, Senik (2004) finds a significantly positive sign for Russian panel data, which she explains by the 
use of the informational content of changes in other people’s incomes in forming one’s own income 
expectations (see also Schyns, 2002). We consider family income instead of individual income for two 
reasons. First, on a conceptual level, family income may be a more adequate determinant of S since the 
impact of income on S runs primarily via individual consumption and this is related to family rather 
than individual income. Second, the dataset that we use (see Sec. 6) contains better data for family 
than for individual income. However, since the consumption out of the family income is divided over 
all household members, we control for number of adults and number of children in the household.   
 
H2: S depends significantly positively on the difference between family income and the average 
family income in a social reference group (relative income), controlling for family income 
(absolute income), family size/composition, and other relevant variables. 
 
This hypothesis corresponds to the reference dependence of Kahneman and Tversky’s value function, 
and is explicitly confirmed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) (see Sec. 2.1). It allows to separate the 
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influence on S of the level of income relative to the social reference income from the impact of the 
absolute level of income. 
 
H3: S depends significantly more positively on relative income than on absolute income. 
 
This hypothesis investigates the dominance of reference dependence over reference-independent 
effects. 
 
H4: S is concave in positive values of relative family income and convex in negative values of 
relative family income. 
 
This hypothesis corresponds to the diminishing sensitivity of the marginal value of both gains and 
losses, which is implied by Kahneman and Tversky’s value function and suggested by the results of 
Galanter reported above. 
 
H5: The degree of concavity of S in positive values of relative family income equals the degree of 
convexity in negative values of relative family income (for equal absolute magnitudes of 
negative and positive relative family income). 
 
This hypothesis corresponds to the reflection effect with respect to gains and losses as hypothesized by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, pp. 268-269), which is distinguished from the asymmetry implied by 
loss aversion (see below). Several studies on decision utility suggest that the value function for gains 
and losses is fairly well approximated by power functions with similar exponents, both less than unity 
(Swalm, 1966; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Kahneman, 2003). These exponents reflect the degrees 
of concavity of the value function for gains and of convexity for losses. On the other hand, for the case 
of ‘predicted utility’ Galanter reports higher estimated exponents for losses than for gains (see Sec. 
2.1). This suggests that experienced utility of money may be less convex in losses than it is concave in 
gains. For decision utility this is also hypothesized by Köbberling et al. (2004). They argue that the 
psychological perception-of-quantity effect as decribed by Kahneman and Tversky’s value function is 
then confounded with the economic intrinsic-utility-of-money effect, which is assumed to exhibit 
diminishing marginal utility. This argument can explain Galanter et al.’s findings for ‘predicted utility’ 
as well. However, in the present life-satisfaction context the intrinsic-utility-of-money effect can be 
associated with the effect of absolute income on S, while the effect of relative income may be fully 
consistent with the characteristics of the value function, including the reflection effect. We therefore 
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maintain hypothesis H5. Furthermore, because of the association of the absolute income effect with 
diminishing marginal intrinsic utility of money we hypothesize: 
 
H6: S is concave in (positive values of) absolute family income. 
 
Finally, 
 
H7: S as a function of relative income is significantly steeper for negative values of relative income 
than for positive values (at equal absolute magnitudes of negative and positive relative 
income). 
 
This hypothesis corresponds to the loss aversion implied by Kahneman and Tversky’s value function 
and suggested by the results of Galanter (see also Wakker and Tversky, 1993). 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1.Limitations of probit analyses 
To test our hypotheses, first of all a reliable measure of life satisfaction is needed. Usually, such a 
measure involves a person’s answer to a survey question about her/his overall life satisfaction. For 
example, in the GSOEP data set we use in this paper the satisfaction question is:  
Please, answer according to the following scale: 0 means completely dissatisfied, 10 means 
completely satisfied.  
How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?4 
The resulting score of reported life satisfaction (R) can be considered as a reasonably reliable measure 
of a person’s ‘true’ life satisfaction (S), but the reliability of the score is limited by its discreteness and 
nonrandom measurement errors (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2002a, 2002b; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Frijters, 2004; Luttmer, 2004). 
First, we address the problem of discreteness of R. Following Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2004), we assume that a person’s reported life satisfaction R is a stepwise-increasing function R0(S) of 
her true life satisfaction or well-being S plus a discrete measurement error term e. Function R0(S) is 
supposed to be the same for every individual in the survey. This implies that if R0(Si) of individual i is 
higher than R0(Sj) of individual j, Si is higher than Sj (interpersonal ordinal comparability of R0(S); see 
assumption A2 of Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004)). However, individuals may make errors e in 
                                                 
4 This is the English translation in the GSOEP of 2001 of the German question. Surprisingly, in previous years 
the same question was translated in terms of ‘unhappy’ and ‘happy’ instead of ‘dissatisfied’ and ‘satisfied’ (see, 
e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). We assume the more recent translation is the more correct one.    
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reporting their true life satisfaction S. If these errors are randomly distributed among the individuals 
with average 0=e , the relation of S to relative income and other explanatory variables can be 
estimated by an ordered probit or logit. The latent variable Z is then considered as a proxy for the true 
well-being S (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Frey and Stutzer, 2002b, p. 406). 
However, the question is whether this interpretation of Z is valid not only in an ordinal, but 
also in a cardinal sense. The answer seems to be no since ordered probit or logit analysis only uses the 
ordinal information in the reported R scores (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004, p. 32; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters, 2004, Sec. 3.2), and hence can never contain cardinal information on R, and so 
S. More specifically, probit (or logit) analysis is based on the assumption that reported R is a stepwise-
increasing function R(Z) of an underlying latent variable Z ( kR =  if and only if 1+<≤ kk Z λλ ). This 
function R(Z) may differ from the stepwise-increasing function R0(S) as defined above5, and it is easily 
shown that Z can be any (continuously differentiable) monotonously increasing function of S. Ordinal 
properties of S are then the same as the ordinal properties of Z, but cardinal properties of S and Z like 
concavity and convexity (see hypotheses H4-H6) may differ from each other. 
A more adequate approach is cardinal probit or logit analysis, which makes use of the cardinal 
information in the reported R scores as well (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004, p. 32). A score i 
of R is then assumed to indicate that S is in the interval ]5.0,5.0[ +− ii   (but in [0, 0.5] for i = 0 and in 
[9.5, 10] for i = 10). This implies that the estimated threshold values 0λ ,…, 11λ  of latent variable Z 
correspond to the values 0, 0.5, 1.5,…,9.5, 10, respectively, of S. We can then construct S as a 
monotonously increasing function of Z. In general, this function tends to have a non-linear shape like 
that of a statistical distribution function. Therefore, Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell approximate this 
function by the standard-normal-distribution function. However, the non-linearity of such a function 
makes significance proofs of concavity/convexity of S complicated and tedious.  
 
3.2. Least-squares regression with individual fixed effects 
With regard to concavity/convexity of S, a direct regression of reported life satisfaction R on relative 
income and the other explanatory variables is much simpler and intuitively easier to interpret. We 
should then make the assumption that the stepwise-increasing function R0(S) correctly reflects the 
cardinal structure of S, i.e. the intervals of S that are mapped onto the step levels i = 1,…,10 have 
equal width (as in the special case of the above cardinal-probit assumption). Again assuming that 
measurement error e is random, an imaginary regression of R on S that allows for a non-linear as well 
                                                 
5 In fact, the ordered-probit estimation selects those threshold values λ0,…,λ11 of Z that give an optimal fit of the 
data to the (log)linear equation for Z. These estimates of λi imply a certain shape of R(Z) which may be different 
from the unknown shape of R0(S). 
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as linear shape of the relation would then yield a linear relation (see assumption A3 and its plausibility 
arguments in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004)). 
However, a general drawback of the usual LS of a loglinear specification is that it in principle 
requires estimation on the real axis, whereas the range of R scores is bounded between 0 and 10. This 
may be remedied by regressing a logit or lognormal specification, but then significance proofs again 
become tedious. Moreover, a loglinear specification may give a good approximation since the 
variation in R that is explained by the explanatory variables is small relative to the [0,10] scale. In the 
case of LS with individual fixed effects (which we apply in this paper), the loglinear specification 
may, for each individual, be considered as a first-order Taylor expansion in the ln explanatory 
variables (X) around an individual-specific baseline level of well-being that is determined by the value 
of the individual fixed effect (cf. Frey and Stutzer, 2002b, p. 407). Regressing the loglinear 
specification over all individuals in the sample then amounts to averaging the coefficients of X over all 
these individual first-order Taylor expansions. 
We include individual fixed effects to account for differences in personality characteristics, 
which explain the larger part of the total variation in happiness (see Kahneman et al., 1999). Applying 
LS with individual fixed effects implies that only the variation of R with X over time is estimated 
(within effects). This has certain disadvantages (see Sec. 5.2), but a great advantage in the present 
context is that it seems to require only intertemporal cardinal comparability of R scores (as in 
intertemporal utility-maximizing models), but no interpersonal cardinal or ordinal comparability of R. 
This is because the individual fixed effects also correct for differences in the levels at which 
individuals “anchor” their R scale (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). This measurement error may 
not be random but correlated with explanatory variables like income, educational level, and gender 
(e.g. via personal characteristics like optimism and intelligence; Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 
2005). This causes the regression coefficients to be biased in the absence of individual fixed effects. 
Thus, controlling for such effects implies a strong unbiased test of properties like concavity of R in X, 
which seems to avoid the problematic assumption of interpersonal comparability of R scores. Because 
of this advantage, we adopt least squares estimation of R(X) with individual fixed effects as our 
baseline estimation. 
 
3.3.Cultural norms 
Although individual fixed effects correct for some important nonrandom measurement errors e that 
individuals make in reporting their true life satisfaction S, they do not control for all. In particular, 
there may be cultural norms that lead people to systematically overestimate or underestimate their 
happiness in certain domains of the scale (see, e.g., Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 2005). This 
may especially affect cardinal properties of the life satisfaction function like concavity and convexity. 
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For instance, consider a culture (like perhaps the British) where people are reluctant to give a high 
assessment of their happiness (Oswald, 2005).6 This will lead to an underestimation of high values of 
S, implying a systematic downward bias of R and a concave shape of the regression relation between R 
and S (see above). Estimated concavity of R in relative or absolute income Y could then be due to a 
comparable degree of concavity of the estimated Rˆ  in S, leaving no (significant) concavity of true life 
satisfaction S in Y. This can be seen by writing )(ˆ YR  as ))((ˆ YSR  (see Oswald, 2005, for a formal 
proof, and see Sec. 7.1 for more details). On the basis of this possibility Oswald concludes that the 
usual finding of diminishing returns of income in happiness research does not prove diminishing 
marginal utility. Moreover, in the context of our study, it seems to dismiss regressions of reported life 
satisfaction R on relative and absolute income as a reliable means to test hypotheses H4-H6. 
 However, we can ask how strong concavity of estimated Rˆ  in S might be. This question is 
investigated in Section 7.1. Under plausible assumptions it is shown there that extreme distortions like 
that envisioned by Oswald imply degrees of concavity that are still significantly lower than estimated 
degrees of concavity of R in relative income according to least squares estimation (LS). This result 
implies that estimated significant concavity of R in relative income according to LS cannot be (fully) 
explained by possible concavity of Rˆ  in S, and hence implies significant concavity of S in relative 
income. Thus, even in the presence of distorting cultural norms we can rely on LS regressions of R(X) 
to test hypotheses H4-H6. 
     
4. Life satisfaction equations 
4.1. Specifications 
The usual specification used in econometric work on life satisfaction and social reference income (e.g., 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004) is: 
eXYYR r ++−+= δγβα lnln~ ,            (1) 
where Y is family income, rY  is the average family income in a social reference group, X is a vector of 
control variables, e is an error term, and the Greek symbols stand for parameters. Parameters β~  and 
γ  are supposed to be non-negative and δ  is a vector of parameters. Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
 eXYYYR r ++−+−+= δγγβα )ln(lnln)~( ,           (2) 
which separates the relative income effect of rYY lnln −  from the absolute income effect of Yln . The 
former variable can also be written as )/ln( rYY , and the absolute-income coefficient γβ −~  is denoted 
as β . 
 In the context of Kahneman and Tversky’s value-function theory rYY −  seems the relevant 
variable, but )/ln( rYY  can be rewritten as ]/)(1ln[)]1/(1ln[ rrr YYYYY −+=−+ , i.e. as a 
                                                 
6 It is interesting to note that a similar reluctance to give high grades is found in the grading system at British 
universities, where an 8 tends to be the virtual maximum on a [0-10] scale (Sugden, personal communication).  
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monotonously increasing function of rr YYY /)( − . This rr YYY /)( −  indicates gains and losses as 
(percentual) fractions of rY . In the present context of a variable reference income Yr (as opposed to 
prospect theory), the fractional gains and losses rr YYY /)( −  seem even more relevant determinants of 
life satisfaction than the ‘absolute’ gains and losses rYY − . We denote the relative income gap 
rr YYY /)( −  as G. Hence, specifications (1) and (2) can be used to test hypotheses H1-H3. However, 
specification (2) cannot be used to test hypotheses H4 and H5 since it is concave in G for losses as 
well as gains. For that purpose, we nest specification (2) into a more flexible power-function 
specification that is given by 
eX
YY
YR r ++−
−++=
−
δργβα
ρ
1
1)/(
ln
1
, 1≠ρ .               (3) 
Here the power-function term approaches )/ln( rYY  for 1→ρ . Rewriting the power function term as 
)1/(]1)/)(1[( 1 ργ ρ −−−+ −rr YYY , it is easily seen that it is concave in rr YYYG /)( −≡  for 0>ρ  and 
convex in G for 0<ρ . Concavity of S in positive G and convexity of S in negative G can then be 
tested as follows. First, we define positive relative income +G , respectively negative relative income 
−G  as equal to G for positive, respectively negative values of G, but as equal to zero for negative, 
respectively positive values of G (cf. Ferrer-i-Carbonell). Then, we modify specification (3) as 
eX
GG
YR ++−
−++−
−+++=
−
−
−
−
+
−
+
+
−+ δργργβα
ρρ
1
1)1(
1
1)1(
ln
11
,        (4) 
where we allow for different parameters +γ  and −γ  (see below) as well as +ρ  and −ρ . Concavity of S 
in +G  and convexity of S in −G  then correspond to 0>+ρ  and 0<−ρ . 
 
4.2. Parameter inequalities implied by hypotheses 
Assuming that reported life satisfaction R is a good proxy for true life satisfaction S (see Sec. 3.3), the 
hypotheses in Section 2 imply the following inequalities for the parameters in specifications (1)-(4). 
Hypothesis H1 corresponds to a significantly positive value of γ  in specification (1), and H2 to 
significantly positive values of γ  in specifications (2) and (3) and of +γ  and −γ  in specification (4). 
Hypothesis H3 corresponds to a significantly positive values of βγβγ ~2 −≡−  in specification (2).  
Hypothesis H4 (concavity in gains and convexity in losses) corresponds to +ρ  being 
significantly positive and −ρ  being significantly negative in specification (4). For hypothesis H5 
(equal degrees of concavity in gains and convexity in losses) we need a measure for concavity and 
convexity. For our power function specification a convenient (though somewhat arbitrary) measure is 
±ρ , which equals Pratt’s measure of relative risk aversion/loving ≡)/( rYYrr  
))/(//())/(/)(/( 22 rrr YYRYYRYY ∂∂∂∂−  for rYY ≥  and rYY ≤ , respectively. This is a commonly 
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used index to describe curvature of utility.7 Hypothesis H5 then implies that −ρ  should not differ 
significantly from +− ρ . To test the concavity of S in absolute family income (hypothesis H6), we 
replace the term Ylnβ  in specification (4) by the more flexible term )1/()1( 1 σβ σ −−−Y , 1≠σ  
(which approaches Ylnβ  for 1→σ ), and estimate whether σ  is significantly positive while β  is 
significantly positive as well. 
Hypothesis H7 (loss aversion, i.e. steeper slope for losses than for gains) is consistent with a 
significantly positive value of γ  in specification (2) and significantly positive values of γ  and ρ  
(concavity) in specification (3) since the marginal utility of relative income rr YYYG /)( −≡  then rises 
as G falls from positive to negative values. However, usually loss aversion is associated with a kink in 
the slope of the value function at the origin with a steeper slope for losses (see Kahneman, Knetsch 
and Thaler, 1991). Kőbberling and Wakker (2005) even restrict their definition of loss aversion to this 
discontinuity property. In specification (4) it corresponds to a discontinuity in the slope 
±
−
±±± =+=∂∂ ± γγ ρ)1(/ GGR  at 0=±G  with +− > γγ . In the context of our study it is more 
appropriate to use the wider definition of loss aversion that is expressed in hypothesis H7 and that is 
already implied by concavity of R in +G  and −G  without any discontuinity in the slope. Such 
‘elementary’ loss aversion is sufficient for an asymmetry in the social comparison similar to that 
postulated by Duesenberry (1949) to emerge. In the context of risk behaviour it causes risk aversion 
(see Sec. 8.2 and Kőbberling and Wakker, 2005). In general, specification (4) implies loss aversion in 
this wide sense for all positive values of +− =GG ||  if +− ≥ γγ , 0>+ρ  and 0>−ρ  (concavity in gains 
as well as losses). However, if hypothesis H4 (concavity in gains and convexity in losses) holds, this 
condition cannot be fulfilled since −ρ  will then be negative. Fulfilment of hypothesis H7 then depends 
on the values of −γ  and −ρ  relative to +γ  and +ρ  and of GGG ≡= +− ||  in a complicated way 
according to the slope condition )(/)(/ GGRGGR +− ∂∂>−∂∂ . On the other hand, if hypothesis H4 is 
rejected, matters may become less complicated (see Sec. 6.1). 
A stronger version of hypothesis H7 is that this slope condition also holds in the limit for G 
approaching zero. This implies a kink in the satisfaction function for 0G = , and so a significantly 
higher value of −γ  than the value of +γ  (see above). The postulate of Duesenberry (1949) that richer 
people do not become happier from comparing their income with that of poorer members of their 
reference group even implies that +γ  should not differ significantly from zero (cf. Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2005). 
 
 
                                                 
7 Note, however, that this measure is defined in terms of rYY / , and so not in terms of +G  and −G . See Sec. 8.2 
for more on this. 
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4.3. Comparison with specification used in prospect theory 
It is interesting to note that the power-function specification used in this study differs from that 
employed by Galanter (1990) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 309). In the present context the 
latter specification would amount to terms +−++
ργ 1G  and −+−− −− ργ 1)( G  for the relative income effects 
in specification (4), where +γ , −γ , and +ρ  are supposed to be positive and −ρ  negative (convexity).8 
For decision utility Tversky and Kahneman obtained parameter estimates that for these relative income 
terms would imply that 12.0=+ρ  and 12.0−=−ρ , and that −γ  is more than twice as high as +γ . This 
would imply equal degrees of concavity in gains and convexity in losses (H4, H5) and loss aversion 
(H7). For ‘predicted utility’ Galanter calculated parameter values that in our context would imply that 
55.0=+ρ  and 45.0−=−ρ  (the relative size of +γ  and −γ  cannot meaningfully be inferred because of 
different scaling in combination with +− −≠ ρρ ). Hence, we would again have concavity in gains and 
convexity in losses (H4), but not equal in degree (H5). Furthermore, in the context of Galanter’s utility 
function loss aversion can easily be shown to hold except for very small values of money. 
However, in contrast to specification (4), the Galanter and Tversky and Kahneman (GTK) 
specification has the drawback of a lack of flexibility: For +G  and −G  approaching zero the slopes 
+−
++++ −=∂∂ ρργ GGR )1(/  and −−−−− −+=∂∂ ρργ ))(1(/ GGR  go to ∞ for 0>+ρ  and 0<−ρ , but to 
0 for 0<+ρ  and 0>−ρ  (see also Köbberling and Wakker, 2005), while the slopes ±∂∂ GR /  
according to specification (4) equal ±γ  at 0== −+ GG  for any values of +ρ  and −ρ . Hence, in the 
former as opposed to the latter case the slopes at 0== −+ GG  do not vary continuously and 
independently from the concavity and convexity parameters +ρ  and −ρ . Another drawback of the 
GTK specification in the present context is that, in contrast to specification (4), it does not include the 
asymmetric variant of the usual loglinear specification (2) (cf. Ferrer-i-Carbonell) as a special or 
limiting case.  
 
5. Operationalization of variables and estimation procedure 
5.1. Measure for social reference income 
An important question is how to define the (social) reference group(s) of a person, i.e. who belongs to 
his/her reference group(s). The reference group that has the strongest influence on the person is likely 
to be the social group to which the individual belongs and which consists of people of similar age, 
education, income, region of residence, etc. (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; cf. Senik, 2004). In addition, 
there will be a less strong influence from wider groups like the person’s community or region of 
residence (Diener et al., 1993; Stutzer, 2004), the person’s cohort (McBride, 2001), or the person’s 
                                                 
8 Taking rr YYYG /)( −≡±  instead of rYY −  in the specification only amounts to a rescaling by a factor rY/1 , 
which is fixed in the context of prospect theory. 
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country (Easterlin, 1995). Thus, in general there will be more than one reference group the average 
income of which can be assumed to affect a person’s life satisfaction (see Kapteyn and Wansbeek, 
1985; Vendrik and Hirata, 2003). However, in econometric research it is usually assumed that there is 
only one reference group which is either identified as the social group of the person (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell) or approximated by one of the wider groups mentioned above. 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell uses education, age, and region as reference group categories. Her reference 
group contains all individuals with a similar education level, inside the same age bracket, and living in 
the same region (West or East Germany for Ferrer-i-Carbonell’s German data). The five different 
education categories are: less than 10, 10, 11, 12, and more than 12 years of education, and the age 
brackets are: younger than 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-65, and 66 years or older. This leads to 50 different 
(exogenous) reference groups. However, this measure has the drawback that the age brackets are fixed. 
This implies, for instance, that when a person becomes 35 years old, his/her reference group suddenly 
changes from 25-34 to 35-44 years old. This is, of course, implausible, and in this respect the measure 
used by McBride (2002) is better. For USA data, he approximates the influence from the reference 
group by the average income in a person’s cohort consisting of everyone from 5 years younger than 
the person to 5 years older. Thus, this reference group moves along with the age of the person. On the 
other hand, a severe downside of this measure is that it does not distinguish between different 
education categories, as Ferrer-i-Carbonell’s measure does. Therefore, in this paper we introduce a 
new measure which combines the best of both measures, i.e. a moving age bracket as McBride’s in 
combination with the education and region categories of Ferrer-i-Carbonell and gender. We added 
gender since especially men may primarily be influenced by the family income of other men. 
 
5.2. Data, variables and estimation procedure 
The database used for all estimations is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP; see Wagner et 
al., 1993; Kroh and Spiess, 2005). The panel covers the years 1984-2001 for West Germany and 1991-
2001 for East Germany. The sample includes about 16000 individuals who stayed on average more 
than eight years in the panel. For most households all individuals are in the sample. The number of 
missing observations for the variables we use is less than 3%.  
The dependent variable used in all estimations is reported individual life satisfaction (see Sec. 
3.1). The main independent variable is real family income, i.e. family income corrected for the 
consumer price index. For social reference income we calculated the refined measure introduced in the 
previous section. As control variables we use more or less the standard variables: First, the number of 
adults and children in the households (see Sec. 2.2); second, the number of years of education, since 
people with a higher educational level may have more skills to become happy; third, unemployment, 
since unemployed people will have a lower level of life satisfaction; fourth, ln age to capture a 
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possible nonlinear effect of age on life satisfaction9; fifth, a number of dummies for family situation 
(married without children, single parent, married with children up to or higher than sixteen years old); 
and finally, working hours with a dummy for missing observations. Time-invariant variables like 
gender are not included, because we estimate with fixed individual effects that catch the effect of these 
variables. 
For our baseline estimations we apply non-linear least squares with fixed time and fixed 
individual effects. We include fixed time effects to account for period effects on happiness. For 
example, people may be influenced by the phase of the business cycle, events in history like the 
reunion of Germany, and the price index may not always be adequate to calculate real income. We use 
fixed individual effects for two related reasons: First, by only estimating the variation of life 
satisfaction with explanatory variables over time (within effects), we seem to avoid the problematic 
assumption of interpersonal comparability of life satisfaction scores (see Sec. 3.2). Second and more 
generally, we prevent biases due to unobserved personality traits like optimism and intelligence 
affecting at the same time life satisfaction and explanatory variables like income and educational level, 
giving rise to spurious correlations between life satisfaction and these variables. On the other hand, 
estimating only within effects means that the information from between effects of interpersonal 
variation is not used. As noted above, this eliminates the impact of time-invariant explanatory 
variables like gender and greatly reduces that of age. In a dynamic context it means that primarily 
short-run shock effects are estimated, implying a potential under or overestimation of long-run level 
effects of explanatory variables (Van Praag et al., 2003; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004, p. 
50). For that reason, we also run estimations with random individual effects (but fixed time effects) as 
a robustness check of the results from the baseline estimations with fixed individual effects (see Sec. 
7.2). 
  
6. Estimation results 
6.1. Tests of hypotheses  
This section presents estimation results for our new reference group measure. We  restrict ourselves in 
this section to the West-German sample because the transformation process in Eastern Germany may 
have generated less stable behaviour over time when the former country was adapting to its new 
situation (see Sec. 7.2 for results for Eastern Germany). We focus on the coefficients that are relevant 
for testing the hypotheses. The other coefficients will be discussed as far as they yield unexpected 
results. 
                                                 
9 We estimate with fixed individual and time effects, which catch the effect of the variation of age between 
individuals and the linear part of the intertemporal effect, respectively (see below). An additional ln age term can 
account for a possible (inverted-) U-shape of life satisfaction as a function of age as found in the literature (see 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004).  
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To test hypothesis H1 we estimated equation (1) with the logarithmic specification of the impact of 
social reference income. The estimated coefficients are presented in the first column of Table 1. The 
coefficient γ  of rYln  (social reference income) is indeed negative and very significant. Thus, 
hypothesis H1 is confirmed. Moreover, γ  is strikingly similar in absolute magnitude to the coefficient 
β~  of Yln  (family income). The size 0.31 of β~  indicates that a ceteris paribus increase in family 
income by 10 % would raise life satisfaction R of the average West German individual by 0.031. On 
the other hand, if at the same time the family income of people in the social reference group rises by 
the same 10%, implying a rise in rY  by 10%, this would lower R by the same amount. The net effect 
of these rises in Y and rY  on R would then be zero! In a nutshell this explains the empirical finding of 
no effect of income growth on average happiness in Germany (as in most other developed countries) 
over time (Glatzer, 1991; Easterlin, 1974, 1995). Note that the separate effects of such rises in Y and 
rY  on life satisfaction are small, but very significant. Here one should keep in mind that income is 
only one of the many determinants of life satisfaction (see also Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). 
Further note that the coefficients of the other determinants in Table 1 have plausible and 
mostly significant values. Unemployment has a strongly significant and sizable negative effect (as 
found in other studies as well; e.g., Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998)), while ln(age) has a 
strongly significant positive effect. Years of education and weekly hours have no significant effect. All 
these effects only reflect the variation of life satisfaction with the explanatory variables over time 
because of the inclusion of individual fixed effects. Moreover, the linear part of the intertemporal 
effect of age is caught by the fixed time effects. The coefficients of the corresponding year dummies, 
which are not presented in Table 1, are all strongly significant and reveal a negative time trend in life 
satisfaction (slope about -0.07). As far as this time trend represents negative effects of rising age it 
counteracts the positive ln age term. The concavity of this term in age in combination with the 
negative time trend is consistent with either an inverted U-shape of R as a function of age or a 
monotonously falling R with age at an increasing rate.10    
Hypothesis H2 was tested using equation (2) with the logarithmic specification of the effect of 
relative income as well as equations (3) and (4) with the power-function specification. The estimates 
for equation (2), as presented in the second column of Table 1, show that the coefficient γ  of ln 
(relative family income) is indeed positive and very significant. In fact, by definition all coefficients 
except that for absolute income are identical to the corresponding coefficients for equation (1). Note 
that with relative income in the equation the coefficient of absolute income becomes insignificant. In 
equation (3) (see the first column of Table 2) the coefficient γ  of the relative income term is 
                                                 
10 If the negative time trend exactly captures the negative age effects, R is decreasing in age from a maximum at 
about 18 years. This is in line with the findings for GSOEP data of Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) and 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), but in contradiction with that of Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005).  
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significantly positive as well. For the asymmetric specification (4) (second column of Table 2) we 
estimated 293.0=+γ  and 404.0=−γ , which are both significantly positive. Thus, hypothesis H2 was 
confirmed for all specifications.   
The estimates of the coefficients for relative and absolute income in equation (2) strongly 
suggest that they differ significantly (hypothesis H3). A Wald test indeed showed this marginally to 
hold (p = 0.06), thus giving support to hypothesis H3. 
Unexpectedly, hypothesis H4 (concavity in gains and convexity in losses) is only partially 
supported by the estimates of +ρ  and −ρ  in equation (4): 928.1=+ρ  is considerably higher than zero, 
but not significantly so due to a large standard error, and 785.0=−ρ  is significantly positive (see 
Appendix A for details of the non-linear estimation procedure). This implies insignificant concavity of 
life satisfaction in positive relative income and significant concavity of life satisfaction in negative 
relative income. However, because of the nonlinear dependence of R on +ρ  and −ρ , we also applied 
likelihood-ratio tests to test the significance of the positivity of +ρ  and −ρ  (see Appendix A). This 
yielded the result that not only −ρ , but also +ρ  is significantly positive, in contradiction to the t-test 
result! This contradiction stems from bimodality of the log-likelihood function and is a well-known 
phenomenon in non-linear estimation. In general, it does not seem to be justified to trust one test result 
more than the other, but in this case of bimodality of the log-likelihood function, the likelihood-ratio 
test seems to make more sense. This would imply that life satisfaction is significantly concave in 
positive relative income as well. The concavity of life satisfaction in negative as well as positive 
relative income is shown in Figure 1, which represents the dependence of life satisfaction on relative 
income G for the average West German individual in the 1984-2001 sample according to the estimated 
equation (4). 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Fig. 1 here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis H5 (equal degrees of concavity in gains and convexity in losses) is obviously 
rejected since R is significantly concave in negative relative income. On the other hand, the estimated 
exponents 928.1=+ρ  and 785.0=−ρ  suggest that R is more concave in positive relative income than 
it is in negative relative income. However, due to the large standard error in +ρ , the t-value of the 
difference in degree of concavity −+ − ρρ  is 1.02, implying no significant difference. On the other 
hand, a likelihood-ratio test of H0: 0=− −+ ρρ  yielded 
86.336.5)8.0,8.0(ln)785.0,928.1(ln2 >=− LL , and so a significant difference in degree of 
concavity. Thus, according to this test, R is significantly more concave in positive relative income than 
it is in negative relative income. 
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A test of hypothesis H6 (concavity in absolute income) seems to be dubious because the 
coefficient of absolute income is not significant at all. To check this, we estimated specification (4) 
with the term )1/()1( 1 σβ σ −−−Y , 1≠σ , instead of Ylnβ  for a grid of fixed values of σ  between 
5.2−  and 7.6. This yielded the surprising result that the loglikelihood is maximal for 6.7≥σ , with β 
significantly negative. Thus, R is decreasing and convex in absolute income, implying a strong 
rejection of hypothesis H6. This implausible result may be caused by multicollinearity with the 
positive relative income term, which had a higher +γ  and +ρ  than in the baseline estimation.         
Hypothesis H7 (loss aversion, i.e. steeper slope for losses than for gains) is confirmed for 
equations (2) as well as (3) due to the concavity in relative income ( 0095.1 >=ρ  in eq. (3)). For 
equation (4) we found +− > γγ , 0>+ρ  and 0>−ρ , implying loss aversion. However, this loss 
aversion is not significant for all values of +− =GG ||  since −γ  is not significantly greater than +γ  (t-
value of +− − γγ  is 0.6) and +ρ  may not be significantly positive (see above). Therefore, we 
performed Wald tests on the slope condition >−=−∂∂ −−−− ργ )1()(/ GGGS  
+−
++ +=∂∂ ργ )1()(/ GGGS  for fixed values of G. This indicated that the slope condition is significant 
for 160G .≥ , so for incomes at least 16 % higher or lower than the reference income (note that 
−−
−− −=−∂∂ ργ )1()(/ GGGS  approaches ∞  for G going to one). Since the outcome of the Wald test 
for a nonlinear parameter restriction tends to depend on the specification of the restriction, we also did 
the test for the ln of the slope condition. This indicated significance of the slope condition for 
12.0≥G , so for somewhat lower values of G than above. For our sample considerably less than 50 % 
of the individuals are in these domains. Since the insignificance of +− − γγ  may be due to the 
simultaneous estimation of +γ  and −γ  with +ρ  and −ρ  we also estimated equation (4) with fixed 
optimal values 928.1=+ρ  and 785.0=−ρ . The difference between the estimated 293.0=+γ  and 
404.0=−γ  then turned out to be marginally significant (t-value = 1.71, p-value = 0.086). This implies 
(marginally) significant loss aversion for all values of +− =GG ||  if we assume that the concavity in 
positive relative income is significant, as suggested by the pertinent likelihood-ratio test (see above). 
This would then confirm Duesenberry’s asymmetry postulate except that the impact of positive 
relative income is still significant. However, the test results on loss aversion are mixed.   
 
6.2. Tests of specifications 
In testing the hypotheses we used the rather flexible specification (4) as well as the more restricted 
specifications (1)-(3). This raises the question whether the latter specifications are not too restrictive, 
i.e. whether they are rejected against the more general specification (4). First, a Wald test as well as a 
likelihood-ratio test of the joint restrictions 0=− +− γγ  and 0=− +− ρρ  in equation (4) yields a clear 
rejection (p = 0.018 for the Wald test), although the separate restrictions are not rejected by t-tests (see 
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above). Thus, we can conclude that asymmetric specification (4) gives a significantly better fit of the 
data than symmetric specification (3). 
Second, we tested whether the power-function specification in equation (4) fits significantly 
better than the corresponding asymmetric variant of the logarithmic equation (2) (third column of 
Table 1; cf. Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005, fourth specification). A Wald test does not reject joint 
restrictions 0=− +− ρρ  and 01=−−ρ  in equation (4) (p = 0.101), but a likelihood-ratio test does. 
Thus, there is mixed evidence whether the asymmetric power-function specification fits significantly 
better than the asymmetric logarithmic one. Because of this mixed evidence we also tested for a 
significant difference between the latter specification and the symmetric logarithmic specification (2). 
Both a t-test and a likelihood-ratio test reject restriction 0=− +− γγ  (t-value = 3.1), again indicating 
the superiority of the asymmetric specification. In general, we can conclude that specification (4) is 
more suitable than the other specifications to test hypotheses H2 and H7 (and of course H4 and H5).  
 
7. Robustness 
7.1. Distortions of reported-life-satisfaction scale 
Do the significant cardinal properties of reported life satisfaction R as a function of negative and 
positive relative income that we have found in our estimations imply similar cardinal properties of true 
life satisfaction S? In particular, does the estimated significant concavity of R in negative (and 
positive) relative income reflect similar concavity of S, or can it be explained by possible concavity of 
“OLS-estimated” Rˆ  in S? To make this investigation tractable, we assume that the scale of true life 
satisfaction S is continuous, bounded from above and below, and cardinal. Boundedness from above 
and below means that true life satisfaction has a maximum and a minimum value, corresponding to 
complete satisfaction and dissatisfaction, respectively.11 Without loss of generality, we can choose the 
scale of S such that the maximum value of S is 10 and its minimum value is 0, so that S, just as R, has 
values from 0 to 10.12 Cardinality of this scale then means that a difference in S between, say, 7.5 and 
8.5 represents the same difference in satisfaction intensity for an individual as the difference between 
5.5 and 6.5.13 Next, we assume that scores of reported life satisfaction R deviate within certain extreme 
limits (to be specified below) from the levels of true life satisfaction S that they report. 
Deviations of R from S may give rise to estimated Rˆ  being concave in S. In particular, as 
mentioned in Section 3.3, people may be reluctant to give a high assessment of their happiness 
                                                 
11 Complete satisfaction and dissatisfaction are translations of ‘ganz und gar zufrieden’ and ‘ganz und gar 
unzufrieden’, respectively, in the German GSOEP formulation of the life satisfaction question. These terms 
clearly suggest that they correspond to maximum and minimum values of life satisfaction.  
12 This scale can be obtained by applying a specific linear (i.e. affine) transformation to any other cardinal scale 
that S happens to have. Cardinality of the scale is preserved under such a transformation. 
13 Note that, in the present context of individual-fixed-effect estimations, this cardinal comparability of 
differences in S only needs to hold for an individual over time, but not between individuals (see Sec. 3.2.).  
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(Oswald, 2005). In the context of our assumptions on the scale of S, people who experience a true life 
satisfaction S between 9.5 and the maximal value 10 may report this by a score of R = 8 (in line with 
the British grading system, see footnote 6). However, Figure 2 shows that although most individuals in 
the West German sample reported R = 8, there are also a lot of people who reported a 9 or 10. This 
implies that even if a number of West Germans who experienced an S between 8.5 and 10 reported R = 
8, others did not.14 It might be possible that on average West Germans who experienced an S between 
9.5 and 10 reported around R = 9, but an average score of R = 8 for these people seems implausible. 
Let us therefore consider the former possibility of an average R = 9 and construct a continuous 
concave function )(ˆ SR  such that 5)5(ˆ =R , 7)7(ˆ =R  and 9)10(ˆ =R . For this we need a flexible 
function with at least three parameters. A suitable one turns out to be the power function 
bcSaSR −−= 1)()(ˆ  with parameters 0>a , 10 << b  (concavity parameter) and 0>c . The inverse of 
this function is the convex function caRRS rr += ++ 11 /ˆ)ˆ( , where 0)1/( >−≡ bbr  (convexity 
parameter). As eRR −=ˆ , it is given by the right-hand side of equation (4) minus e. Substituting this 
expression for Rˆ  into the function )ˆ(RS  then yields S as a function )],,,(ˆ[ XGGYRS −+  of Y, +G , 
−G , and X. What we want to know is whether, according to our estimated coefficients of equation (4), 
S is significantly concave in −G  and +G  despite the convexity of )ˆ(RS . For that we need to 
investigate whether the second-order partial derivative 22 / mGS ∂∂  is significantly negative for all 
values of mG  and 5ˆ ≥R  ( )ˆ(RS  is likely to be less convex or even concave for 5ˆ <R ). First, the first-
order derivative mGS ∂∂ /  can be derived as =∂∂∂∂=∂∂ )/ˆ)(ˆ/(/ mm GRRSGS  
rr aGRr +−++= 1/)1(ˆ)1( mmm ργ . Differentiating this to mG  and imposing negativity yields the condition 
rG mmmm
ργρ −+> 1)1(5                         (5) 
for all values of mG . Here we substituted 5 for Rˆ  since the condition for 5ˆ =R  implies the condition 
for 5ˆ >R . On the left-hand side of this equation we see the estimated degree of concavity mρ  of Rˆ  in 
mG , while on the right-hand side the degree of convexity r of S in Rˆ  appears.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Fig. 2 here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
For negative relative income 1785.0 <=−ρ , or 01 >− −ρ , implies 
1)01()1( 11 =+≤+ −− −−− ρρG  for all 0≤−G , and hence fulfilment of condition (5) for all 0≤−G  if and 
only if it holds for 0=−G . Condition (5) then simplifies to r−− > γρ5  . This condition is satisfied for 
all values of r such that 3.925 > 0.404 r, i.e. for r < 9.72. For positive relative income 1928.1 >=+ρ , 
or 01 <− +ρ , implies 1)01()1( 11 =+≤+ ++ −−+ ρρG  for all 0≥+G , and hence fulfilment of condition 
                                                 
14 People in Preussen in North Germany may be reluctant to report a high R, but people in Bayern (South 
Germany) and Rheinland-Westfalen (Western state) seem more straight in their reporting (Winfried Koeniger 
and Matthias Wibral, personal communication). 
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(5) for all 0≥+G  if and only it holds for 0=+G . Condition (5) then simplifies to r++ > γρ5 . This 
condition is satisfied for values of r such that 9.640 > 0.293 r, i.e. for r < 32.24. The three restrictions 
5)5(ˆ =R , 7)7(ˆ =R , and 9)10(ˆ =R  for )(ˆ SR  lead to a power equation in r (see Appendix B) that can 
only be solved numerically and yielded a value r = 1.41. This value satisfies the above conditions for r 
for negative as well as positive income, implying that condition (5) is fulfilled for all mG . Thus, for 
this rather extreme distortion of the reported life satisfaction scale condition (5) is fulfilled for negative 
as well as positive relative income (and 5ˆ ≥R ). Therefore, despite of the distortion true life 
satisfaction is concave in both domains. This even holds for the implausibly extreme concavity of Rˆ  
in S that is implied by the restrictions 5)5(ˆ =R , 7)7(ˆ =R , and 8)10(ˆ =R , yielding r = 5.30 (see 
Appendix B). 
Another kind of distortion of the reported-life-satisfaction scale may arise from a cultural 
norm that one is supposed to be either very glad or very sad (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; 
Frey and Stutzer, 2002a). Moderate values of S above 5 are then overrated, whereas moderate values 
of S below 5 are underrated. Although we did not find indications that this may hold for our German 
sample (see footnote 14), we cannot exclude this possibility. It leads to concavity of Rˆ  in S higher 
than 5 and to convexity of Rˆ  in S lower than 5. The latter convexity implies that for S lower than 5 the 
estimated significant concavity of R in negative and positive relative income reflects even stronger 
concavity of S. Hence, the analysis can be confined to the implications of concavity of Rˆ  in S higher 
than 5. An extreme distortion occurs if on average West Germans who experienced an S between 6.5 
and 7.5 reported R = 8. Combining this with the restrictions 5)5(ˆ =R  and 10)10(ˆ =R  yields r = 2.58 
(see Appendix B). This value again satisfies the above conditions for r for negative as well as positive 
relative income, leading to the same conclusion that despite of the distortion true life satisfaction is 
concave in negative as well as positive relative income.15 
However, for the concavity of S in negative and positive relative income to be significant, 
condition (5) should be satisfied significantly. Therefore, for negative relative income we performed 
Wald tests on condition (5) for r = 1.41, 2.58, and 5.30, and various values of −G  between 0 and -1. 
For r = 1.41 (2.58) the H0 of equality was strongly rejected with p ranging from 0.002 (0.014) for 
0=−G  to 0.000 for 1−=−G . On the other hand, for r = 5.30 the H0 of equality was not rejected for 
0=−G  (p = 0.23), but only rejected for 7.0−≤−G , which comprised very few observations. Thus, for 
negative relative income condition (5) is satisfied significantly for r = 1.41 and r = 2.58, but not for r = 
5.30. For positive relative income +ρ  is not significantly positive according to a t-test, or equivalently 
                                                 
15 Concavity of Rˆ  in high S and convexity in low S will also result from truncations of the measurement error e 
in R at scores near 10 and 0 due to the impossibility of scores higher than 10 or lower than 0. However, the 
former concavity is likely to be weaker than that corresponding to 9)10(ˆ =R  as analysed above. It might also be 
possible that the S scale is not bounded as assumed above, but extends to infinite values for R = 10 and R = 0. 
However, even then the resulting concavity seems weaker than that assumed above.  
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Wald test (see Sec. 6.1). Therefore, Wald tests on the stronger concavity condition (5) will not reject 
the H0 of equality. However, we also did likelihood-ratio tests, which yielded the opposite result for r 
= 1.41, 2.58, and 5.30 (see Appendix B and cf. Sec. 6.1). 
Summarizing, we can conclude that, according to our estimates of equation (4), true life 
satisfaction S is significantly concave in negative relative income even in the presence of extreme 
concavities of reported life satisfaction Rˆ  in S as assumed above (r = 1.41 or 2.58). On the other hand, 
for positive relative income we can only conclude that S is significantly concave on the basis of 
likelihood-ratio tests, but not on the basis of Wald tests. 
 
7.2. Alternative specifications, populations, and estimation procedure 
The control variables age and years of education are also determinants of our measure of social 
reference income (see Sec. 5.1). This may give problems of multicollinearity. In order to test for that 
we estimated equation (4) without either age or education or both. Omitting age does not essentially 
change the estimates for negative relative income, but it makes the coefficient +γ  of positive relative 
income insignificant (at a p = 0.05 level), while the coefficient of absolute income becomes less 
insignificant (especially when education was omitted as well). The exponent +ρ  for positive relative 
income becomes even more positive, but remains insignificant (according to a t-test). Omitting only 
education does not affect the estimates for relative income. On the other hand, replacing ln age by age 
squared makes +ρ  as well as +γ  significantly positive and −ρ  and −γ  even more significantly 
positive than in the baseline estimation. Both +γ  and −γ  are higher with +− > γγ . Age squared has a 
strongly significant negative effect, while the time dummies no longer display a negative time trend.  
This suggests that the time trend in our baseline estimations is caused by the age effect. 
 In order to test for robustness of our results we also conducted estimations for the Galanter and 
Tversky and Kahneman (GTK) specification of the impact of relative income in equation (4) (see Sec. 
4.3), for three alternative populations, and with random individual effects. The estimates for the GTK 
specification are shown in the third column of Table 2. The relative-income coefficients 055.0=+γ  
and 146.1=−γ  are positive, and −γ  is significant, but +γ  is insignificant. The absolute-income 
coefficient β  is insignificant and the other coefficients are similar to those for equation (4). The 
exponents 568.0=+ρ  and 672.0=−ρ  indicate significant concavity of S in negative as well as 
positive relative income. The degrees of these concavities do not significantly differ. Finally, loss 
aversion only holds for 029.0|| >= +− GG , so for incomes more than 2.9 % higher or lower than the 
reference income (note that by definition the slope −∂∂ GR /  is zero at 0=−G ; see Sec. 4.3). Thus, 
these results are more or less in line with those for our baseline estimations with some characteristics 
being more significant despite of the drawbacks of the GTK specification (as mentioned in Sec. 4.3).  
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 Equation (4) was also estimated for the subpopulations of West German men and women and 
for the sample from East Germany (see Sec. 5.2). For both West German men and women the relative-
income coefficients +γ  and −γ  are significantly positive with the coefficients for women being 
insignificantly higher. The absolute-income coefficient β  is insignificant for both sexes. Furthermore, 
for both men and women S is insignificantly concave in positive relative income (according to a Wald 
test) and significantly concave in negative relative income with the concavity for men being 
insignificantly stronger. Thus, there is no significant difference in the effects of relative income 
between the sexes. For the East-German sample we found significantly positive relative-income 
coefficients +γ  and −γ , which are insignificantly higher than the estimates for West Germany in Table 
2. The effect of absolute income is again insignificant and S is concave in positive as well as negative 
relative income, but both concavities are insignificant. This last result may be related to the smaller 
sample size for Eastern Germany (36313 observations).   
 Finally, Equation (4) was estimated with random instead of fixed individual effects (along the 
lines of Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). In this case the exponents +ρ  and −ρ  could not be estimated 
directly, but only via an estimation of equation (4) for a grid of fixed values of +ρ  and −ρ  and 
determination of the global maximum of the log likelihoods (cf. Appendix A). The results were similar 
to those for the fixed individual effects in Table 2 with a somewhat higher coefficient −γ  and a 
somewhat lower coefficient +γ , but the differences are not significant. Hence, we did not find 
indications of significant differences between long-run level and short-run shock effects of relative 
income (see Sec. 5.2). On the other hand, we found a strongly significant positive effect of the mean of 
ln real income over the sample period. Although this effect is supposed to account for possible 
correlations of unobservable individual characteristics like optimism and intelligence with absolute 
income, a part of the effect may be due to long-run level effects of absolute income being higher than 
short-run shock effects.16 It can then not be concluded that long-run level effects of absolute income 
are insignificant and significantly lower than long-run level effects of relative income (hypothesis H3). 
 
8. Possible explanations and behavioural implications 
8.1. Explanations 
From the perspective of prospect theory, the most striking result that we found is that of strongly rising 
sensitivity of life satisfaction S to more negative values of relative income. On the basis of prospect 
theory we expected the opposite, namely a diminishing sensitivity of S to more negative relative 
                                                 
16 It is remarkable that Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) interpret the effect of 
mean ln income solely as a correction for correlation of the random individual effect with income, whereas Van 
Praag et al. (2003) and Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) consider it as evidence for long-run effects of 
income being higher than short-run shock effects. In our view, a combination of both interpretations is the most 
correct one. 
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income. Although our result is in line with the standard assumption of diminishing marginal utility of 
income in microeconomics, the contradiction with prospect theory calls for an explanation. One 
possible explanation is that the average income in the reference group of a person affects her (his) life 
satisfaction not only since she compares her income with this reference income, but also since her 
income relative to the reference income affects the extent to which she and her family can participate 
in social activities in the reference group. Such social activities, like trips, theatre visits, school 
outings, etc. cost money, and tend to be more costly as the average income in the reference group is 
higher. When your income is only little below the reference income, this will not be a problem, but if 
your income is considerably lower, it may become a financial problem for you and your family to 
participate in all social activities that your family members would like to participate in. As your 
income falls increasingly short of that in your reference group, it becomes increasingly and more than 
proportionally hard to raise the funds to participate in the social activities of the reference group. 
 In general, there seem to be two channels through which relative income affects life 
satisfaction. First, a direct, subjective perception effect of social comparison, which, according to the 
prospect theory, leads to a diminishing marginal sensitivity of life satisfaction to more positive as well 
more negative levels of relative income. Second, an indirect, objective functioning (Sen, 1985) effect 
of a lack of social participation, leading to a diminishing marginal sensitivity of life satisfaction to 
more positive relative income, but to a rising marginal sensitivity of life satisfaction to more negative 
relative income (see Vendrik and Hirata, 2003, for the distinction between both kinds of effect). In the 
context of prospect theory the latter effect may also be interpreted as a social version of the ruin effect 
for high losses as postulated by Kahneman (2003, p. 705). In the positive domain the diminishing 
marginal sensitivities of life satisfaction to relative income due to social comparison and social 
participation effects reinforce each other, whereas in the negative domain the diminishing marginal 
sensitivity of life satisfaction to relative income due to social comparison is counteracted and even 
dominated by the rising marginal sensitivity of life satisfaction to relative income due to social 
participation deficits. This interpretation is supported by our result from a likelihood-ratio test that 
reported life satisfaction R is significantly more concave in positive relative income than it is in 
negative relative income. Since variations in R around a specific social reference income cover only a 
small range of the total scale of R, and hence are relatively insensitive to distortions of this scale (see 
Sec. 7.1), this result probably carries over to true life satisfaction S.  
Thus, in the present case the objective functioning effect of a lack of social participation seems 
to be more important for life satisfaction than the subjective perception effect of social comparison. In 
terms of the ruin effect in prospect theory, we may then say that in our case a social version of the ruin 
effect dominates the social comparison effect already for small losses. However, other interpretations 
of our results are also possible. An interesting one is that people whose income is below their 
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reference income may cope with this by choosing a new social reference group with a lower average 
income. Prospect theory then predicts that life satisfaction will be concave in income higher than this 
new reference income, which however is lower than the reference income used in the estimations. 
Even if prospect theory is right in predicting that life satisfaction is convex in income lower than the 
new reference income, the estimations with the overrated reference income can then still result in an, 
on average, concave shape of life satisfaction in income below this overrated reference income 
(Huffman, personal communication). On the other hand, the finding that people are significantly less 
satisfied below their overrated reference income then remains. This might be due to the new reference 
group consisting of people with a lower educational level, among which the person feels less at home.    
 
8.2. Implications for behaviour 
The properties of the relative-income dependence of life satisfaction that have been discussed above 
may also have implications for certain decisions that people take. In general, people can be expected to 
aim at raising their life satisfaction by their decisions. By now there is a lot of evidence that people are 
often not successful in that, for instance when they fail to take into account that when their own 
income rises that of others may rise as well (implying little change in their relative income, and hence 
in their life satisfaction, see Sec. 6.1). However, this lack of anticipation of changes in exogenous 
variables does not deny that the structure of their decision utility function may be similar to that of 
their experienced utility function of life satisfaction (cf. Stutzer, 2003). In such a situation, the 
concavity properties of the latter function that we have found have interesting implications.  
First, when the decision involves risky alternatives, the decision-taker will be risk averse for 
negative as well as positive relative income. This is in contrast to the risk seeking in losses that is 
implied by prospect theory. The concavity of life satisfaction in relative income may be said to cause 
this risk aversion by implying ‘elementary’ loss aversion relative to any specific positive/negative 
level of relative income (see Sec. 4.2.). An appealing feature of the power-function specification in 
equation (4) is that it can easily be shown to imply increasing relative risk aversion relative to the 
reference income17 for rising positive relative income as well as for falling negative relative income. In 
the positive domain this seems to be consistent with what many empirical studies find (Köbberling et 
al, 2004).  
Second, in a context of riskless labour supply decisions, when the income is the result of a 
choice of working hours of effort, there are two implications. The first one is an application of a model 
for status behaviour that has been developed by Clark and Oswald (1998). Translated in the context of 
                                                 
17 Note that the constant measures of relative risk aversions ±ρ  of the power function in (4) hold with respect to 
0/ =rYY .  
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our life-satisfaction study, that model addresses the question whether people will raise or lower their 
working hours or effort when their social reference income rY  rises. According to the so-called ratio-
comparison variant of the model, the strong concavity of S in positive relative income that is 
associated with 193.1 >=+ρ  implies that in the positive domain people will raise their working hours 
or effort when rY  rises (following behaviour in the terminology of Clark and Oswald). On the other 
hand, the weaker concavity of S in negative relative income that is associated with 179.0 <=−ρ  
implies that in the negative domain people will start to work less or make less effort when rY  rises 
(deviant behaviour). Unfortunately, both implications are insignificant since neither +ρ  nor −ρ  differ 
significantly from one according to both a t-test and a likelihood-ratio test. In other words, for positive 
as well as negative income the estimated power-function specification in equation (4) does not 
significantly differ from a logarithmic one, according to which people do not react to a rise in their 
reference income. 
Another labour supply implication is suggested by research of Goette et al. (2004) on within-
day labour supply of cabdrivers and bicycle messengers. They formulate an intertemporal model of 
reference-dependent preferences for allocation of effort over a working day. The model is based on the 
Kahneman-Tversky value function with an income target acting as the reference point. The convexity 
of the value function for income below this target and the concavity for income above the target lead 
to the prediction that in the course of the day effort will first increase as earnings approach the target 
and then decrease as earnings have passed the target. This pattern is confirmed by empirical studies of 
the labour supply of cabdrivers and bicycle messengers. However, the estimates obtained for our life 
satisfaction function suggest a different pattern: when the social reference income acts as an income 
target, the concavity of the life satisfaction function for negative as well as positive relative income 
implies diminishing marginal life satisfaction as income rises. This would imply falling effort or 
working hours as income rises for levels below as well as above the target. A possible explanation for 
this difference in effort pattern is that in the behaviour of cabdrivers and bicycle messengers clearly a 
subjective perception effect of comparison with the income target is the main effect, whereas in the 
present life satisfaction context an objective deprivation effect of lack of social participation seems to 
dominate. 
  
 
9. Conclusion 
This paper investigated seven hypotheses about the impact of social reference income on individual 
life satisfaction. These hypotheses are based on Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory, which uses 
an asymmetric value function to explain human decisions. This paper seems to be the first to test the 
characteristics of this value function for experienced utility. The estimation results confirm 
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asymmetric effects for positive and negative relative income, and indicate concavity of life satisfaction 
in positive relative income. But in contrast to prospect theory, life satisfaction turns out to be 
significantly concave in negative relative income as well. Moreover, under plausible assumptions on 
the cardinal properties of the ‘true-life-satisfaction’ scale, this result is shown to be robust to extreme 
distortions of the reported-life-satisfaction scale. The result is not as surprising as it may seem from 
the perspective of prospect theory. People participate in activities within their social reference groups. 
As their income is lower it becomes more and more difficult to do so because they don’t have enough 
money for these activities. It is, therefore, quite understandable that the marginal effect of a fall in 
income below the reference income increases with the relative income gap. 
 
Appendix A. Non-linear estimation of +ρ  and −ρ  and likelihood-ratio tests 
The non-linear estimation procedure for equation (4) required starting values of +ρ  and −ρ  close to 
their final values due to the closeness of these values to 0 (causing overflow). To obtain suitable 
starting values of +ρ  and −ρ , we first estimated equation (4) for a grid of fixed values of +ρ  and −ρ  
between -4 and 4 with a difference 0.1 between successive values. The log likelihoods for all these 
fixed values of +ρ  and −ρ  revealed a lower and very flat local maximum besides the sharper absolute 
maximum for both +ρ  and −ρ . For −ρ  this did not pose a problem because the local maximum is 
located at about 4=−ρ , i.e far above 0. Applying a likelihood-ratio test to the null-hypothesis H0: 
0.0=−ρ  yielded 86.334.11)0.0(ln)785.0(ln2 >=− LL  ( )1(2χ  threshold value at p = .05), and so 
rejection of H0. Thus, just as with the t-test (or, equivalently, Wald test), we can conclude that 
785.0=−ρ  is significantly positive. For +ρ  matters are more complicated since the local maximum is 
now located at 0.1−=+ρ , i.e. below 0. This seems to explain the large standard error in the estimate 
1.928 for +ρ . However, applying a likelihood–ratio test to the null-hypothesis H0: 0.1−=+ρ  (i.e. at 
the local-maximum) yielded 86.364.11)0.1(ln)928.1(ln2 >=−− LL , and so rejection of H0. Since 
)(ln +ρL  is lower than the local maximum )0.1(ln −L  for any other non-positive value of +ρ , it then 
follows that a likelihood-ratio test rejects the null-hypothesis H0: 0++ = ρρ  for any 00 ≤+ρ . 
 
Appendix B. Derivation of convexity parameter r  and likelihood-ratio tests for condition (5) 
The three restrictions 5)5(ˆ =R , 7)7(ˆ =R  and 9)10(ˆ =R  on bcSaSR −−= 1)()(ˆ  in Section 7.1 
correspond to the restrictions 5)5( =S , 7)7( =S  and 10)9( =S  on the inverse function 
caRRS rr += ++ 11 /ˆ)ˆ( . Substituting the latter three restrictions into the latter function yield the 
equations 5/5 '' =+ ca rr ,  7/7 '' =+ ca rr , 10/9 '' =+ ca rr , where rr +=1' . Subtracting the first 
equation from the second yields ''' 257 rrr a=−  and subtracting the second equation from the third 
yields ''' 379 rrr a=− . Dividing the latter equation by the former and rewriting leads to the equation 
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055.175.29 ''' =∗+∗− rrr . Solving this equation numerically yields r’ = 2.41, and so r = 1.41. The 
other sets of restrictions yield in an analogous way r = 5.30 and r = 2.58, respectively.    
Besides Wald tests, we also did likelihood-ratio tests to determine whether condition (5) is 
satisfied significantly for positive relative income. The H0 of equality: r++ = γρ5  implies 
r0586.0=+ρ . First, consider the highest r = 5.30 for the implausibly extreme distortion. The 
corresponding +ρ  equals 0.31. Hence, for 40.0=+ρ  (for which we obtained a log-likelihood value, 
see App. A) condition (5) is just fulfilled. Applying a likelihood-ratio test to H0: 40.0=+ρ  yields 
86.368.10)40.0(ln)93.1(ln2 >=− LL , and so rejection of H0. This means that the estimated 
928.1=+ρ  is significantly higher than 40.0=+ρ , for which condition (5) is satisfied. We can then 
conclude that, according to a likelihood-ratio test for r = 6.30, concavity condition (5) is satisfied 
significantly for our estimated 928.1=+ρ . Hence, even for this implausibly extreme distortion of the 
reported-life-satisfaction scale concavity condition (5) is fulfilled significantly. It then immediately 
follows that concavity condition (5) is also fulfilled significantly for the lower r = 1.41 and r = 2.58. 
Thus, in all cases we have a contradiction with the result from a Wald test. 
 
References 
Blanchflower, D.G. and A.J. Oswald (2004). “Well-being over Time in Britain and the USA”. Journal 
of Public Economics, 88, 1359-1386. 
Clark A.E. and A.J. Oswald (1998), “Comparison-Concave Utility and Following Behaviour in Social and 
Economic Settings”, Journal of Public Economics, 70, 133-155. 
Diener, E., E. Sandvik, L. Seidlitz, and M. Diener (1993). “The Relationship between Income and 
Subjective Well-Being: Relative or Absolute?” Social Indicators Research, 28, 195-223. 
Duesenberry, J.S. (1949), Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior, Cambridge, MA. 
Easterlin, R.A. (1974). “Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical 
Evidence.” In P. A. David and M. W. Reder (eds.), Nations and Households in Economic Growth: 
Essays in Honor of Moses Abramowitz. New York and London: Academic Press: 89-125. 
Easterlin, R.A. (1995), “Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?”, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 27, 35-47. 
Easterlin, R.A. (2001). “Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory”. The Economic Journal, 
111 (473), 465-484. 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. (2005). “Income and Well-being: An Empirical Analysis of the Comparison 
Income Effect”, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 997-1019. 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. and P. Frijters (2004). “How Important is Methodology for the Estimates of the 
Determinants of Happiness?”. The Economic Journal, 114 (July), 641-659.  
Festinger, L. (1954). “A Theory of Social Comparison.” Human Relations, 7, 117-140. 
 29
Frank, R.H. (1997). “The Frame of Reference as a Public Good”, The Economic Journal, 107 (Nov), 
1832-47. 
Frey, B.S., and A. Stutzer (2002a). Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions 
Affect Well-Being. Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
 Frey, B.S. and A. Stutzer (2002b). “What can economists learn from happiness research?”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 40: 402-435. 
 Galanter, E. (1990). “Utility Functions for Nonmonetary Events”, American Journal of Psychology, 103 
(4), 449-470. 
 Glatzer, W. (1991). “Quality of life in advanced industrialized countries: The case of West Germany”, 
in F. Strack, M. Argyle and N. Schwarz (eds.), Subjective Well-Being: An Interdisciplinary 
Perspective. Oxford: Pergamon: 261-279. 
 Goette, L., E. Fehr, and D. Huffman (2004), “Loss Aversion and Labor Supply”, Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 2 (2-3), 216-218.   
Johansson-Stenman, O. and P. Martinsson (2005), “Identity, Self-Deception and Subjective Well-
Being”, Working paper, Department of Economics, Götenborg University.  
Kahneman, D. (1999), “Objective Happiness”, in D. Kahneman, E. Diener, and N. Schwarz (eds.), 
Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Ch. 1. 
Kahneman, D. (2003), “A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality”, 
American Psychologist, 58, 697-720. 
Kahneman, D., E. Diener, and N. Schwarz (1999), Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Kahneman, D., J.L. Knetch, and R.H. Thaler (1991), “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss 
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 1: 193-206.  
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”, 
Econommetrica, 47, 263-291. 
Kahneman, D., P.P. Wakker and R. Sarin (1997), “Back to Bentham?: Explorations of Experienced 
Utility”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 375-405.  
Kapteyn, A., and T. Wansbeek: 1985, “The individual welfare function: A review”. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 6, 333-363. 
Köbberling, V., C. Schwieren and P.P. Wakker (2004), “Prospect-Theory’s Diminishing Sensitivity 
versus Economic’s Intrinsic Utility of Money: How the Introduction of the Euro Can Be Used to 
Disentangle the Two Empirically”, Working paper, Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration, Maastricht University. 
Köbberling, V., and P.P. Wakker (2005), “An Index of Loss Aversion”, Journal of Economic Theory, 
122: 119-131.  
 30
Kroh, M., and M. Spiess (2005). “Documentation of Sample Sizes and Panel Attrition in the German 
Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), 1984-2004”, Data Documentation 6, 2005, DIW, Berlin. 
Luttmer, E. (2004), “Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being”, NBER Working 
Paper 10667, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA. 
McBride, M. (2001). “Relative-Income Effects on Subjective Well-Being in the Cross-section”, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45, 251-278. 
Oswald, A.J. (2005). “On the Common Claim that Happiness Equations Demonstrate Diminishing 
Marginal Utility of Income”. IZA Discussion Paper, No. 1781, IZA, Bonn.  
Schyns, P. (2002). “Wealth Of Nations, Individual Income and Life Satisfaction in 42 Countries: A 
Multilevel Approach.” Social Indicators Research, 60, 5-40. 
Sen, A. K. (1985). Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Senik, C. (2004), “When Information Dominates Comparison: Learning from Russian Subjective 
Panel Data’, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2099-2123. 
Stutzer, A. (2004), “The Role of Income Aspirations in Individual Happiness, Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 54, 89-109. 
Stutzer, A. (2003), “Income Aspirations, Subjective Well-Being and Labor Supply”, Working paper, 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich. 
Swalm, R.O. (1966), “Utility Theory: Insights into Risk Taking”, Harvard Business Review, 44, 123-
136. 
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1991), “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent 
Model”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 1039-1061. 
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1992), “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of 
Uncertainty”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323. 
Van Praag, B.M.S. and A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004), Happiness Quantified: A Satisfaction Calculus 
Approach, Oxford University Press. 
Van Praag, B.M.S., P. Frijters, A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003), “The Anatomy of Subjective Well-
Being”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 51, 29-49.   
Vendrik, M. and J. Hirata (2003), “Experienced versus Decision Utility of Income: Relative or 
Absolute Happiness”, Research Memorandum METEOR, RM/03/039, Faculty of Economics and 
Business Administration, Maastricht University, forthcoming in L. Bruni and P.L. Porta (eds.; 
2006), Handbook of Economics and Happiness, Edward Elgar 
Wagner, G.G., R.V. Burkhauser, and F. Behringer (1993), “The English Language Public Use File of 
the German Socio-Economic Panel, Journal of Human Resources, 28: 429-433. 
Wakker, P.P. and A. Tversky (1993), “An axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory”, Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 7: 147-176. 
 31
Winkelmann, L. and R. Winkelmann (1998), “Why are the Unemployed So Unhappy? Evidence from 
Panel Data”. Economica, 65, 1-15.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Estimation results for testing hypotheses 1-3 and 7 
Linear least-squares estimation with fixed individual and time effects for Western Germany 1984-2001, with 
White cross-section standard errors 
 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 2, asymmetric 
Variable Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
Constant 2.158 2.05 2.158 2.05 2.156 2.06 
Ln(family income) 0.313 14.04 0.003 0.04 0.010 0.12 
Ln(reference income) -0.310 -4.02     
Ln(fam. inc./ref. inc.)   0.310 4.02   
Pos. ln (fam. inc./ref. inc.)     0.207 2.34 
Neg. ln (fam. inc./ref. inc.)     0.358 4.78 
Ln(number of adults) -0.141 -6.02 -0.141 -6.02 -0.141 -6.02 
Ln(1+number of children) -0.076 -2.27 -0.076 -2.27 -0.079 -2.35 
Unemployed -0.633 -11.96 -0.633 -11.96 -0.627 -11.82 
Ln(years of education) -0.020 -0.18 -0.020 -0.18 -0.022 -0.19 
Ln(age) 1.271 9.59 1.271 9.59 1.267 9.53 
Couple 0.305 10.08 0.305 10.08 0.292 9.97 
Single parent -0.168 -4.69 -0.168 -4.69 -0.174 -4.87 
Couple with children below 17 -0.188 -8.14 -0.188 -8.14 -0.183 -8.00 
Couple with children above 16 -0.115 -3.87 -0.115 -3.87 -0.114 -3.88 
Couple with children both 
below 17 and above 16 0.160 3.80 0.160 3.80 0.148 3.57 
Ln(1+weekly hours worked) 0.021 1.00 0.019 0.93 0.018 0.89 
Weekly hours dummy 0.043 0.66 0.041 0.63 0.040 0.61 
       
Number of observations 102068  102068  102068  
Number of  individuals 11077  11077  11077  
Log likelihood -171313.8  -171313.8  -171306.7  
Adjusted R2 0.440  0.440  0.440  
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Table 2. Estimation results for testing hypotheses 2, 4, 5 and 7 
Nonlinear least-squares estimation with fixed individual and time effects for Western Germany 1984-
2001, with White cross-section standard errors 
 
 Equation 3 Equation 4  GTK equation 
Variable Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
Constant 2.205 2.09 2.139 2.03 1.604 1.79 
Ln(family income) -0.003 -0.03 0.015 0.17 0.096 1.62 
Rel. income term 0.308 3.50    
ρ  1.095 7.37    
Pos. rel. income term   0.293 3.88 0.055 1.15 
+ρ    1.928 1.58 0.568 3.34 
Neg. rel. income term   0.404 3.21 1.146 2.25 
−ρ    0.785 4.24 0.672 2.55 
Ln(number of adults) -0.139 -6.13 -0.149 -6.44 -0.150 -6.2 
Ln(1+number of children) -0.076 -2.27 -0.082 -2.46 -0.083 -2.4 
Unemployed -0.631 -11.81 -0.627 -11.84 -0.626 -11.9 
Ln(years of education) -0.021 -0.18 -0.018 -0.16 -0.024 -0.21 
Ln(age) 1.274 9.66 1.260 9.44 1.243 9.68 
Couple 0.302 10.30 0.291 9.77 0.289 9.80 
Single parent -0.170 -4.79 -0.172 -4.83 -0.175 -4.83 
Couple with children below 
17 -0.187 -8.06 -0.183 -8.17 -0.183 -8.26 
Couple with children above 
16 -0.115 -3.88 -0.111 -3.82 -0.112 -3.80 
Couple with children both 
below 17 and above 16 0.157 3.81 0.148 3.53 0.144 3.55 
Ln(1+weekly hours worked) 0.021 1.00 0.019 0.93 0.019 0.90 
Weekly hours dummy 0.043 0.66 0.041 0.63 0.040 0.61 
   
Number of observations 102068  102068  102068 
Number of  individuals 11077  11077  11077 
Log likelihood -171312.2  -171302.3  -171304.7 
Adjusted R2 0.440  0.440  0.440 
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Figure 1. Dependence of individual life satisfaction on relative income for Western 
Germany, 1984-2001 (equation 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Sample distribution of reported life satisfaction for Western Germany, 1984-
2001 
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